Abstract. Key substitution vulnerable signature schemes are signature schemes that permit an intruder, given a public verification key and a signed message, to compute a pair of signature and verification keys such that the message appears to be signed with the new signature key. Schemes vulnerable to this attack thus permit an active intruder to claim to be the issuer of a signed message. A digital signature scheme is said to be vulnerable to destructive exclusive ownership property (DEO) If it is computationaly feasible for an intruder, given a public verification key and a pair of message and its valid signature relatively to the given public key (m, s), to compute a pair of signature and verification keys and a new message m ′ such that s is a valid signature of m ′ relatively to the new verification key. In this paper, we investigate and solve positively the problem of the decidability of symbolic cryptographic protocol analysis when the signature schemes employed in the concrete realisation have this two properties.
Introduction
According to West's Encyclopedia of American Law, a signature is "A mark or sign made by an individual on an instrument or document to signify knowledge, approval, acceptance, or obligation. . . [Its purpose] is to authenticate a writing, or provide notice of its source 1 . . . "
We will not deal any further with legal considerations, but it is interesting to note that while digital signatures are primarily employed to authenticate a document, i.e. ensure that the signer endorses the content of the document, they can also be employed to prove the origin of a document, i.e. ensure that only one person could have signed it. Indeed, most of the cryptographic work on digital signatures has aimed at certifying that no-one could sign a document in the place of someone else. The analysis of digital signature primitives has however focused on the former authentication property. Formally speaking, the yardstick security notion for assessing the robustness of a digital signature scheme is the existential enforceability against adaptative chosen-message attacks (UNF-CCA) [10] . This notion states that, given a signing key/verification key pair, it is infeasible for someone ignorant of the signing key to forge a message that can pass the verification with the public verification key, and this even when messages devised by the attacker are signed beforehand. The security goal provided by this property is the impossibility (within given computing bounds) to impersonate a legitimate user (i.e. one that does not reveal its signature key) when signing a message.
We note that this robustness does not address the issue of the identification of a source of a message. However, this latter concept is also pertaining to digital signatures when they are employed in a non-repudiation protocol. While one would not differentiate the two properties at first glance, they are different since the authentication property requires the existence of the participation of the signer in the creation of the message, while the latter mandates the unicity of a possible creator of a message.
The two notions of message authentication and source authentication collapse in the single-user setting when there exists only one pair of signature/verification keys. They may however be different in a multi-user setting. We believe that the first work in this direction was the discovery of a flaw on the Station-to-Station protocol by Blake-Wilson and Menezes [12] , where the authors show how it is possible to confuse a participant into thinking it shares a key with another person than the actual one. The attack consisted in the creation, by the attacker, of a signature/verification key pair dependent upon messages sent in the protocol. Defining a signature scheme to have the Duplicate Signature Key Selection (DSKS) property if it permits such a construction with non-negligible probability, they showed that several standard signature schemes (including RSA, DSA, ECDSA and ElGamal) had this property, but also that a simple countermeasure (signing the public key along with the message) existed in all cases, but was rarely implemented. This DSKS property was formally defined as Key substitution in [2] , where it is also discussed, after a review of what could be called an attack on a signature scheme in the multi-user setting. It was also later presented independently in [8] as Conservative Exclusive Ownership. The companion property of Destructive Exclusive Ownership by which an intruder may also change arbitrarily the signed message is also introduced and they showed that the usual signature algorithms (such as RSA and DSS) have this property. While the same attacks as in [2] are exhibited, the authors also demonstrate how this can be used in practice to poison a badly implemented PKI with fake CRLs (T. Pornin, personal communication).
Automated validation of security protocols.
Cryptographic protocols have been applied to securing communications over an insecure network for many years. While these protocols rely on the robustness of the employed security primitives, their design is error-prone. This difficulty is reflected by the repeated discovery of logical flaws in proposed protocols, even under the assumption that cryptographic primitives were perfect. As an attempt to solve the problem, there has been a sustained effort to devise formal methods for specifying and verifying the security goals of protocols. Various symbolic approaches have been proposed to represent protocols and reason about them, and to attempt to verify security properties such as confidentiality and authenticity, or to discover bugs. Such approaches include process algebra, model-checking, equational reasoning, constraint solving and resolution theorem-proving (e.g., [14, 9, 16, 1] ).
Our goal is to adapt the symbolic model of concrete cryptographic primitives in order to reflect inasmuch as possible their imperfections that could be used by an attacker to find a flaw on a protocol. The work described in this paper relies on the compositionality result obtained in [17] that permits us to abstract from other primitives and consider protocols that only involve a signature scheme having DSKS property (resp. vulnerable to DEO property).
Outline. In Section 2 we will present an attack by Baek et al. demonstrating how an actual intruder can use the DSKS property of a signature scheme to attack a protocol. We then describe in Section 3 the formalism in which we will analyse cryptographic protocols. In Section 4 we present how we model the possible actions of an intruder taking advantage of the DSKS property of a signature scheme and in section 5, we present how we model the possible actions of an intruder taking advantage of the vulnerability of signature scheme to DEO property. We present in Section 7 an algorithm that permits to reduce the analysis to an analysis in the empty equational theory, and give in Section 8 a decision procedure for the reachability problem in these protocols. We conclude in Section 9.
An example of attack
We do not present here the original attack on the station-to-station protocol, but one that we believe to be simpler, and given by Baek et al. [3] on the KAP-HY (Key Agreement protocol, proposed by Hirosi and Yoshida in [11] ).
Presentation of the KAP-HY protocol.
This protocol relies on a redundant signature scheme to provide key confirmation at the end of a key exchange. The signature of a message m by agent A is denoted s A (m). Abstracting the details of the Diffie-Hellman key construction with messages u A and u B , and of the signature scheme, the protocol reads as follows:
An unknown key share (UKS) attack on a key agreement protocol is an attack whereby two entities A and B participating in a key agreement protocol may end the protocol successfully, but with a wrong belief on who shares a key with who. In [3] , Baek et al. showed that the redundant signature scheme employed in the KAP-HY protocol possesses the DSKS property, and elaborate on this to show that the KAP-HY is vulnerable to a UKS attack. In this attack, the intruder E waits that A initiates a session with him:
(1)
In this attack, the intruder E records, but passes unchanged, the first message, and initiates a session as A with B. It then intercepts the second message, and builds from the public key of B and from the message s B (u A ) a signature/verification key pair, and registers this key pair. E then passes the signature, but this time accompanied by its identity (2'). The main point is that when A checks the signature of the incoming message, it accepts it on the ground that it seems to originate from E. At the end of this execution, A believes that the key is shared with E whereas it is actually shared with B.
The computation of the new pair of keys (P E , S E ) proceeds as follows. At the end of flow (2), the intruder knows the signature of u A made by Bob using his public key, then, by using DSKS property of the used signature scheme, he creates the new pair of keys (P E , S E ). The crucial point, common to all DSKS attacks, is the construction of a new key pair from a public verification key and from a signed message. We will model this operation with appropriate deduction rules, and prove that protocol analysis remains decidable.
Formal setting

Basic notions
We consider an infinite set of free constants C and an infinite set of variables X . For any signature G (i.e. sets of function symbols not in C with arities) we denote T(G) (resp. T(G, X )) the set of terms over G ∪ C (resp. G ∪ C ∪ X ). The former is called the set of ground terms over G, while the latter is simply called the set of terms over G. The arity of a function symbol g is denoted by ar(g). Variables are denoted by x, y, terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and finite sets of terms are written E, F, ..., and decorations thereof, respectively. We abbreviate E ∪ F by E, F , the union E ∪ {t} by E, t and E \ {t} by E \ t. The subterms of a term t are denoted Sub(t) and are defined recursively as follows. If t is an atom (i.e. t ∈ X ∪ C) then Sub(t) = {t}. If t = g(t 1 , . . . , t n ) then Sub(t) = {t} ∪ n i=1 Sub(t i ). The positions in a term t are sequences of integers defined recursively as follows, ε being the empty sequence representing the root position in t. We write p ≤ q to denote that the position p is a prefix of position q. If u is a subterm of t at position p and if u = g(u 1 , . . . , u n ) then u i is at position p · i in t for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We write t |p the subterm of t at position p. We denote t[s] a term t that admits s as subterm. The size t of a term t is the number of distinct subterms of t. The notation is extended as expected to a set of terms.
A substitution σ is an involutive mapping from X to T(G, X ) such that Supp(σ) = {x|σ(x) = x}, the support of σ, is a finite set. The application of a substitution σ to a term t (resp. a set of terms E) is denoted tσ (resp. Eσ) and is equal to the term t (resp. E) where all variables x have been replaced by the term σ(x). A substitution σ is ground w.r.t. G if the image of Supp(σ) is included in T(G).
An equational presentation H = (G, A) is defined by a set A of equations u = v with u, v ∈ T(G, X ) and u, v without free constants. For any equational presentation H the relation = H denotes the equational theory generated by (G, A) on T(G, X ), that is the smallest congruence containing all instances of axioms of A. Abusively we shall not distinguish between an equational presentation H over a signature G and a set A of equations presenting it and we denote both by H. If the equations of A can be oriented from left to right, we write the equations in A with an arrow, l → r. The equations can then only be employed from left to right, and A is called a rewrite system. An equational theory can in this case be defined by a rewrite system. An equational theory H is said to be consistent if two free constants are not equal modulo H or, equivalently, if it has a model with more than one element modulo H.
Let A be a set of rewrite rules l → r. The rewriting relation → A between terms is defined by t → A t ′ if there exists l → r ∈ A and a substitution σ such that lσ = s and rσ = s
A is convergent if and only if it is terminating and confluent. In this case, all rewriting sequences starting from t are finite and have the same limit, and this limit is called the normal form of t. We denote this normal form (t)↓ A , or (t)↓ when the considered rewriting system is clear from the context. A substitution σ is in normal form if for all x ∈ Supp(σ), the term σ(x) is in normal form.
Unification systems
In the rest of this section, we let H be an equational theory on T(G, X ) and A be a convergent rewriting system generating H.
Definition 1. (Unification systems) Let H be an equational theory on T(G, X ).
A H-unification system S is a finite set of pairs of terms in T(G, X ) denoted by
It is satisfied by a substitution σ, and we note σ |= H S, if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have u i σ = H v i σ. In this case we call σ a solution or a unifier of S.
When H is generated by A, the confluence implies that if σ is a solution of a H-unification system, then (σ)↓ is also a solution of the same unification system. Accordingly we will consider in this paper only solutions in normal form of unification systems. A complete set of unifiers of a H-unification system S is a set Σ of substitutions such that, for any solution τ of S, there exists σ ∈ Σ and a substitution τ ′ such that τ = H στ ′ . The unifier τ is a most general unifier of S if the substitution τ ′ in the preceding equation must be a variable renaming. In the context of unification modulo an equational theory, standard (or syntactic) unification will also be called unification in the empty theory. In this case, it is well-known that there exists a unique most general unifier of a set of equations. This unifier is denoted mgu(S), or mgu(s, t) in the case S = s ? = ∅ t .
Unifiability Problem
Input: A H-unification system S. Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that σ |= H S.
Let us now introduce the notion of narrowing, that informally permits to instantiate and rewrite a term in a single step.
Definition 2.
(Narrowing) Let s and t be two terms. We say t s iff there exists l → r ∈ A, a position p such that t |p / ∈ X and s = tσ[p ← rσ], where σ = mgu(t |p , l). We denote by the narrowing relation.
Assume t t ′ with a rule l → r applied at a position p in t. A basic position in t ′ is either a non-variable position of t not under p or a position p · q where q is a non-variable position in r. Basic narrowing is a restricted form of narrowing where only terms at basic positions are considered to be narrowed. In the rest of this paper, we denote t b.n. t ′ a basic narrowing step.
Intruder deduction systems
The notions that we give here have been defined in [17] . These definitions have since been generalised to consider a wider class of intruder deduction systems and constraint systems [15] . Although this general class encompasses all intruder deduction systems and constraint systems given in this paper, we have preferred to give the simpler definitions from [17] which are sufficient for stating our problem. We will refer, without further justifications, to the model of [15] as extended intruder systems and extended constraint systems. The latter correspond to symbolic derivations in which a most general unifier of the unification system has been applied on the input/output messages.
In the context of a security protocol (see e.g. [5] for a brief overview), we model messages as ground terms and intruder deduction rules as rewrite rules on sets of messages representing the knowledge of an intruder. The intruder derives new messages from a given (finite) set of messages by applying deduction rules. Since we assume some equational axioms H are satisfied by the function symbols in the signature, all these derivations have to be considered modulo the equational congruence = H generated by these axioms. In the setting of [17] an intruder deduction rule is specified by a term t in some signature G. Given values for the variables of t the intruder is able to generate the corresponding instance of t.
Definition 3. An intruder system I is given by a triple G, S, H where G is a signature, S ⊆ T(G, X ) and H is a set of equations between terms in T(G, X ).
To each t ∈ S we associate a deduction rule
Each rule l ։ r in L I defines an intruder deduction relation ։ l։r between finite sets of terms. Given two finite sets of terms E and F we define E ։ l։r F if and only if there exits a substitution σ, such that lσ
We denote ։ I the union of the relations ։ l։r for all l ։ r in L I and by ։ * I the transitive closure of ։ I . Note that by definition, given sets of terms E, E ′ , F and
We simply denote by ։ the relation ։ I when there is no ambiguity about I.
A derivation D of length n, n ≥ 0, is a sequence of steps of the form E 0 ։ I E 0 , t 1 ։ I · · · ։ I E n with finite sets of terms E 0 , . . . E n , and terms t 1 , . . . , t n , such that E i = E i−1 ∪ {t i } for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The term t n is called the goal of the derivation. We define E I to be equal to the set of terms that can be derived from E. If there is no ambiguity on the intruder deduction system I we write E instead of E I .
Simultaneous constraint satisfaction problems
We now introduce the constraint systems to be solved for checking protocols. It is presented in [17] how these constraint systems permit to express the reachability of a state in a protocol execution.
Definition 4. (I-Constraint systems) Let
..,n} , S) and is defined by a sequence of pairs
. . , n}, and E i−1 ⊆ E i for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and Var(E i ) ⊆ {v 1 , . . . , v i−1 } and by an H-unification system S. An I-Constraint system C is satisfied by a substitution σ if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have v i σ ∈ E i σ I and if σ |= H S. We denote that a substitution σ satisfies a constraint system C by σ |= I C.
Constraint systems are denoted by C and decorations thereof. Note that if a substitution σ is a solution of a constraint system C, by definition of deduction rules and unification systems the substitution (σ)↓ is also a solution of C. In the context of cryptographic protocols the inclusion E i−1 ⊆ E i means that the knowledge of an intruder does not decrease as the protocol progresses: after receiving a message a honest agent will respond to it, this response can then be added to the knowledge of the intruder who listens to all communications. The condition on variables stems from the fact that a message sent at some step i must be built from previously received messages recorded in the variables v j , j < i, and from the ground initial knowledge of the honest agents.
Our goal will be to solve the following decision problem for the intruder deduction system modelling a signature scheme having the DSKS property.
I-Reachability Problem
Input: An I-constraint system C. Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that σ |= I C.
Symbolic model for key substitution attacks
A digital signature scheme is defined by three algorithms: the signing algorithm, the verification algorithm and the key generation algorithm. The last algorithm generates for each user a pair of keys, one of them will be used as signing key and will be kept secret, while the other is public and will be used as a verifying key. We abstract the key generation algorithm with two functions, PK( ) and SK( ) denoting respectively the verification and signature keys of an agent. We assume it is not possible, given an agent's name A, to compute PK(A) or SK(A). The signature of a message m with signature key k is a public algorithm Sig( , ), and the resulting signed message is denoted Sig(m, k). We consider signatures with appendix, where the verification algorithm Ver( , , ) -which is available to everyone-takes in its input a message m, a signature s and the public verification key k. The application of the algorithm is denoted Ver(m, s, k), and its outcome can be 0 (s is not the signature of m with the signature key associated with the verification key k) or 1 (s is a valid signature).
In addition to these functions, we add two new functions, P'K( , ) and S'K( , ), which are public and take as argument a signed message s and a verification key k corresponding to this signed message, and output respectively a verification and a signature key denoted P'K(s, k) and S'K(s, k). The verification of s with the verification key P'K(s, k) succeeds.
Given this informal description, the equational theory H DSKS to which these operations abide by is presented by the following set A DSKS of equations:
The public operations defined above are now translated into an intruder system I DSKS = G DSKS , L DSKS , H DSKS with:
Note that the presentation A DSKS is not convergent, and thus we cannot apply results on basic narrowing as is. To this end we introduce a rewriting system R DSKS which is convergent and obtained by Knuth-Bendix [6] completion on A DSKS , and such that two terms have the same normal form for R DSKS iff they are equal modulo H DSKS .
Lemma 1. H DSKS is generated by the convergent rewriting system:
Proof. The application of the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure [6] to H DSKS gives us the convergent rewriting system R DSKS . This rewriting system generates H DSKS , this conclude the proof.
Symbolic model for DEO attacks
′ , s) = 1. A digital signature scheme is defined by three algorithms: the signing algorithm, the verification algorithm and the key generation algorithm. These algorithms have the same properties as above (section 4). We abstract the signature scheme with the following functions symbols: PK( ), SK( ), Sig( , ) and Ver( , , ). In order to model DEO attacks, we introduce three functions symbols, P"K( , ), S"K( , ) and f( , ) which are public and take as argument a signed message s and a public verification key k pub corresponding to this signed message, and output respectively a new verification key, a new signature key and a new message denoted P"K(s, k), S"K(s, k pub ) and f(s, k pub ). The verification of s with the new public key P"K(s, k pub ) and the message f(s, k pub ) succeeds.
Given this informal description, the equational theory H DEO to which these operations abide by is presented by the following set A DEO of equations:
Ver(x, Sig(x, SK(y)), PK(y)) = 1 Ver(x, Sig(x, S"K(y 1 , y 2 )), P"K(y 1 , y 2 )) = 1 Sig(f(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y))), S"K(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y)))) = Sig(x, SK(y))
The public operations defined above are now translated into an intruder system I DEO = G DEO , L DEO , H DEO with:
Note that the presentation A DEO is not convergent, and thus we cannot apply results on basic narrowing as is. To this end we introduce a rewriting system R DEO which is convergent and obtained by Knuth-Bendix [6] completion on A DEO , and such that two terms have the same normal form for R DEO iff they are equal modulo H DEO .
Lemma 2. H DEO is generated by the convergent rewriting system:
Ver(x, Sig(x, SK(y)), PK(y)) → 1 Ver(x, Sig(x, S"K(y 1 , y 2 )), P"K(y 1 , y 2 )) → 1 Ver(f(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y))), Sig(x, SK(y)), P"K(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y)))) → 1 Sig(f(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y))), S"K(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y)))) → Sig(x, SK(y))
Decidability of unifiability
It can easily be shown, using the criterion of termination of basic narrowing on the right-hand side of rules of R DSKS (resp. R DEO ), that basic narrowing terminates when applied with the rules of R DSKS (resp. the rules of R DEO ). The main result of [7] then implies the following proposition, when applying basic narrowing with R DSKS (resp. R DEO ) non-deterministically on the two sides of an equation modulo R DSKS (resp. R DEO ) and terminates with unification modulo the empty theory.
Proposition 1. Basic narrowing is a sound, complete and terminating procedure for finding a complete set of most general H DSKS -unifiers (resp. H DEO unifiers).
One can actually be more precise, and we will need the following direct consequence of Hullot's unification procedure, that states that applying basic narrowing permits one to "guess" partially the normal form of a term t. While this presentation by a convergent rewrite system ensures the decidability of unification modulo H DSKS (resp. modulo H DEO ), we prove bellow that the unifiability problem, as well as the partial guess of a normal form, is in fact in NPTIME.
Lemma 3. Let t be any term and
Complexity of unification Theorem 1. Let t be a term and (D) be a basic narrowing derivation modulo
H DSKS (resp. modulo H DEO ) starting from t. Then, the length of (D) in bounded by t .
Proof. Let us prove the theorem for the basic narrowing derivations modulo H DSKS . Let t be a term and D be a basic narrowing derivation starting from t, D : t = t 0 b.n t 1 b.n . . . b.n t n . R DSKS is convergent and any basic narrowing derivation starting from the right members of the rules of R DSKS terminates, then, by [7] , (D) terminates. Let us prove that D ≤ t . Let P 0 = P(t 0 ) be the number of distinct subterms of t 0 where we can apply the basic narrowing. We note that if the basic narrowing can be applied on a term s at a position p and if there exists another subterm of s at position q such that t |p = t |q , we apply the basic narrowing at the positions p and q at the same time. Let t i b.n t i+1 be a step in (D) and let l i → r i ∈ R DSKS be the applied rule. For any l → r ∈ R DSKS , r is not narrowable. By the fact that r i is not narrowable and by the definition of basic narrowing [7] , we have P i+1 < P i . We deduce that D ≤ P 0 , but P 0 ≤ t 0 then D ≤ t .
The case of derivations modulo H DEO is analogoes.
Corollary 1. The H DSKS -unifiability (resp. H DEO -unifiability) can be decided in NPTIME.
Proof. Let us prove the corollary for H DSKS -unifiability. Let P and Q be two terms. R DSKS is convergent and any basic narrowing derivation starting from the right members of the rules of R DSKS terminates then, there exists an H DSKS -unification algorithm (proposition 1). Let us prove that this algorithm runs in NPtime. Suppose M = H(P, Q), (H is a new function symbol representing the cartesian product), and m = M = P + Q + 1. For any basic narrowing derivation D starting from M, we have D ≤ m (Theorem 1). Suppose that our algorithm always explore the right branch, then, starting from any term M , the algorithm will be perform at most M steps before halting. Then, we have the corollary. By the same reasoning, we prove that H DEO -unifiability can be decided in NPTIME.
Saturation
Construction
Let H be an equational theory presented by a convergent rewrite system R. The saturation of the set of deduction rules L defined modulo the equational theory H is the output of the application of the saturation rules of Figure 1 starting with L ′ = L until any added rule is subsumed by a rule already present in L ′ . Fig. 1 . System of saturation rules.
The application of the saturation rules on L DSKS (resp. on L DEO ) terminates, and yields the following sets of rules:
We define four new extended intruder systems:
These intruder systems do not satisfy the requirements that the left-hand side of deduction rules have to be variables. The deduction relation, the derivations and the set of reachable terms are defined as usual from ground instances of deduction rules.
Properties of a saturated system
In the rest of this paper, we suppose
Let us first prove that the deduction system obtained after saturation gives exactly the same deductive power to an intruder.
Lemma 4. For any set of normal ground terms E and any normal ground term t we have: E ։ * I t if and only if
Proof. First, let us assume that t ∈ E I , that is, there exists a I-derivation (D) starting from E of goal t, and let us prove that there exists a I ′ -derivation starting from E of goal t. If there exists a step in the derivation D which uses a rule l ։ r ∈ L but not in L ′ , then, by construction of L ′ , there exists another rule l 1 ։ r in L ′ such that l 1 ⊆ l and thus that can be applied instead of l ։ r. We conclude that E ։ * I ′ t. For the reciprocal, let us assume that there exists a I ′ -derivation starting from E of goal t, and let us prove that there exists a I-derivation starting from E of goal t. We begin by defining an arbitrary order on the rules of L, and we extend this order to the rules of -If l ։ r has been constructed by the third rule of saturation, there exists a rule
. By definition of deductions, l 1 ։ r 1 can be applied instead of l ։ r. Let (D ′ ) be the derivation where
Since l 1 ։ r 1 has an order smaller than the order of l ։ r, we have M(D ′ ) < M(D), which contradicts the minimality of M(D).
-If l ։ r has been constructed by the second rule of saturation, there exists two rules l 1 ։ r 1 and s, l 2 ։ r 2 in L ′ such that µ = mgu(r 1 , s), s / ∈ X , l = ((l 1 , l 2 )µ)↓ and r = (r 2 µ)↓. suppose that l ։ r is applied on the set of terms F , F ։ l։r F, g. Since (lσ)↓ ⊆ F and (rσ)↓ = g for a substitution σ, we have ( Moreover, we can prove that when considering only deductions on terms in normal form and yielding terms in normal form, it is sufficient to consider derivations modulo the empty theory (Corollary 2).
Lemma 5. Let E (resp. t) be a set of terms (resp. a term) in normal form. We have: E ։ I ′ E, t if and only if E ։ I ∅ E, t. Proof. Assume first E ։ I ′ E, t. There exists a rule l ։ r ∈ L ′ and a substitution σ in normal form such that (lσ)↓ ⊆ E and t = (rσ)↓. By Lemma 3, there exists a set of terms l ′ , r ′ , and a substitution σ ′ in normal form such that l * b.n. l ′ , r * b.n. r ′ , and (lσ)↓ = l ′ σ ′ , and (rσ)↓ = r ′ σ ′ . By the saturation, we have added at some point l ′ ։ r ′ to L ′ . Either this rule is present in the final L' and can be applied, or it is subsumed by a rule that can be applied on E. The converse is left to the reader. Corollary 2. Let E (resp. t) be a set of terms (resp. a term) in normal form. We have: E ։ * I ′ E, t if and only if E ։ * I ∅ E, t.
Next lemma states that if a term in the left-hand side of a deduction rule of the saturated system is not a variable, then we can assume it is not the result of another saturated deduction rule.
Lemma 6. Let E (resp. t) be a set of terms (resp. a term) in normal form. If t ∈ E I ∅ , then there exists a I ∅ -derivation starting from E of goal t such that:
for all I ∅ rules l ։ r applied with substitution σ, for all s ∈ l \ X , we have sσ ⊆ E. Proof. Let us prove by induction on the length n of a derivation D starting from E of goal t that either D satisfies the property or their exists another I ∅ -derivation D ′ of length smaller to n starting from E of goal t which satisfies the property. The case n = 1 is obvious. Suppose that the lemma is true for derivations of length ≤ n and let us prove it for derivations D of length n + 1.
Suppose that D does not satisfy the property, there exists a step i in D where the rule l ։ r is applied with the substitution σ, and there exists s ∈ l \ X such that sσ / ∈ E. Since sσ / ∈ E, it has been constructed at some step j < i. We have:
′ be the rule applied, with the substitution τ , to construct sσ. Since r j τ = sσ, r j and s are unifiable with µ = mgu(r j , s). Then the rule (l j , l \ s ։ r)µ has been constructed. Since µ is a substitution most general than σ, it can be applied on E i to yield t i . This implies that we can reduce D to:
where the construction of sσ is spell and the applied rule at the step i is (l j , l \ s)µ ։ rµ. We note that D ′ < D , then D ′ ≤ n. By induction, either D ′ satisfies the property or there exists another I ∅ -derivation D ′′ starting from E of goal t which satisfies the property. Then, we have the lemma for derivations of length n+1 and this concludes the proof.
Decidability of reachability
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1
The I DSKS -Reachability (resp. I DEO -Reachability) problem is decidable.
The rest of this paper is devoted to the presentation of an algorithm for solving I DSKS -Reachability (resp. I DEO -Reachability) problems and to a proof scheme of its completeness, correctness and termination. This decision procedure comprises three different steps.
Let C be an I-constraint system.
First step: guess of a normal form
Step 1. Apply non-deterministically basic narrowing steps on all subterms of C.
..,n} , S 0 be the resulting constraint system.
Remark. Let σ be a solution of the original constraint system, with σ in normal form. This first step will non-deterministically transform each t ∈ Sub(C) into a term t ′ such that, according to Lemma 3 we will have (tσ)↓ = t ′ σ ′ .
Second step: resolution of unification problems
Step 2. Solve the unification system S 0 modulo the empty theory, and apply the obtained unifier on the deduction constraints to obtain a constraint system
Remarks. We prove below that if there exists a solution to the original constraint system, then there exists a solution of C ′ for the extended intruder system I ∅ . C' itself is not a constraint system, but an extended constraint system. Proof. By definition σ |= I C implies that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have σ |= I (E i ⊲ t i ). Thus there exists by Lemma 4 an I ′ -derivation starting from (E i σ)↓ to (t i σ)↓. Since σ is in normal form, by lemma 3, there exists E
) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and thus we have the lemma.
Apply :
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Third step: Transformation in solved form
Step 3. To simplify the constraint system, we apply the transformation rules of Figure 2 . Our goal is to transform C' into a constraint system such that the right-hand sides of deduction constraints (the t i ) are all variables. When this is the case, we say that the constraint system is in solved form. It is routine to check that a constraint system in solved form is satisfiable.
Proof. It suffices to prove that if x ∈ E ∩ X and σ is a substitution such that σ |= C, then we have σ |= {C α , (E \ {x}) ⊲ t, C β }. Given x ∈ E there exists a set of terms E x ⊆ E such that E x ⊲ x ∈ C α . Since σ |= C we have σ |= E x ⊲ x, and by the fact that E x ⊆ E \ {x} we have σ |= E \ {x} ⊲ x. Since we also have σ |= (E ⊲ t) this implies σ |= E \ {x} ⊲ t. The reciprocal is obvious since E \ {x} ⊆ E.
It also can be proved that the lazy constraint solving procedure terminates. This lemma also helps us to prove the completeness of lazy constraint solving (stated in Lemma 11). Proof. Let nbv(C) = |Var(C)| be the number of variables in C, and M(C) denote the multiset of the right-hand side of deduction constraints in C. Let us prove that after any application of a transformation rule on a constraint system C = (C α , E ⊲ t) (where C α is in solved form), either nbv(C) decreases strictly, or the identity substitution is applied on C during the transformation and M(C) strictly decreases.
The first point will ensure that after some point in a sequence of transformations the number of variables will be stable, and thus from this point on M(C) will strictly decrease. The fact that no more unification will be applied and that the extension of the subterm ordering on multisets is well-founded will then imply that there is only a finite sequence of different constraint systems, and thereby the termination of the constraint solving algorithm. This fact is obvious if the Unif rule is applied, since it amounts to the unification of two subterms of C. It is then well-known that if the two subterms are not syntactically equal, the number of variables in their most general unifier is strictly less than the union of their variables, which is included in Var(C). If they are syntactically equal, then no substitution is applied, and thus denoting C' the result of the transformation, we have M(C) = M(C ′ ) ∪ {t}, and thus M(C ′ ) < M(C). Let us now consider the case of the Apply rule, and let C' be the obtained constraint system. If the underlying intruder deduction rule is in L DSKS , the fact that t is not a variable implies that the variables of the right-hand side of the rule will be instantiated by the strict maximal subterms t 1 , . . . , t k of t. We will thus have: = u for some u ∈ E.
Since this is syntactic unification and since we can assume neither u (by Lemma 8) nor t (by definition of the Apply rule) are variables, we must have u = S'K(u ′ 1 , u ′ 2 ) and t = Sig(t 1 , t 2 ). If σ is the identity on C, we are done, since in this case we have M(C ′ ) = M(C) ∪ {t 1 } \ {t} and thus M(C ′ ) < M(C). Otherwise let us examine how the unification system is solved. It is first transformed into:
Resolving the first equation yields (note that x / ∈ Var(C)):
Let us consider two cases, depending on whether both u ′ 1 and t 2 are variables: -If they are both variables, then solving the first equation removes t 2 from Var(C) but adds a variable y. The second equation will also remove u ′ 1 , but since the variable y is already present, it will not add another variable. Since PK(y) and SK(y) are not unifiable, we note that we must have t 2 = u ′ 1 , and thus we have removed two variables and added one by solving the two first equations. The remaining equation contains only variables of the "intermediate" constraint system, and thus will not add any new variable. In conclusion, in this case, the number of variables of C decreases by at least 1.
-If say t 2 is not a variable, and thus t 2 = SK(t 
Note that up to this point the substitution σ that we built does not affect any variable of C. If this remaining unification system is trivial, then the substitution applied on C is the identity, we are done (see above). Otherwise, since all the variables in this system are in Var(C), it strictly reduces nbv(C). This terminates the proof of this case. Thus, if this rule is applied, either no substitution is applied on C and M(C) strictly decreases, or the number of variables in the resulting constraint system C' is strictly smaller than the number of variables in C. Proof. Let C = (E i ⊲ t i ) i∈{1,...,n} be an I DEO -constraint system not in solved form and let the complexity of C be a couple ordered lexicographically with the following components:
-nbv(C), the number of distinct variables in C, -M(C) the multiset of the right-hand side of deduction constraints in C.
We have to show that each rule reduces the complexity. The fact is obvious if the U nif rule is applied, since it amounts to the unification of two subterms of C. If is then well-known that if two subterms are not syntactically equal, then the number of variables in their most general unifier is strictly less than the union of their variables, which is included in Var(C). If their are syntactically equal, then no substitution is applied, and thus denoting C' the result of transformation, we have M(C ′ ) < M(C). Let us now consider the case of Apply rule, and let C' be the obtained constraint system. If the underlying intruder deduction rule is in L DEO , the fact that t is not a variable implies that the right-hand side of the rule will be instantiated by the strict maximal subterms t 1 , . . . , t k of t. we will thus have M(C ′ ) = M(C) ∪ {t 1 , . . . , t k } \ {t} and thus M(C ′ ) < M(C). It is now suffices to prove the Lemma for the rule in L DEO ′ \ L DEO : the applied rule is: f(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y))), S"K(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y))) ։ Sig(x, SK(y)). The substitution σ is the most general unifier of the unification system t ? = Sig(x, SK(y)), e 1 ? = f(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y))), e 2 ? = S"K(PK(y), Sig(x, SK(y))) for some e 1 , e 2 ∈ E. since it is syntactic unification and since we can assume neither e 1 , neither e 2 (by Lemma 8) nor t (by definition of the Apply rule) are variables, we must have t = Sig(t 1 , t 2 ), e 1 = f(v 1 , v 2 ), and e 2 = S"K(v 3 , v 4 ).
-If t 2 ∈ X , we have σ(x) = t 1 , σ(t 2 ) = SK(y) and the unification system is then transformed into: = Sig(t 1 , SK(y)) . By the fact that t 3 is replaced by y, x, y / ∈ Var(C), and the number of variables in σ is strictly less than the union of variables of the unification system, we deduce that nbv(C ′ ) < nbv(C). -If t 2 / ∈ X then t 2 = SK(t 3 ). We have σ(x) = t 1 , σy = t 3 and the unification system is then transformed into: = Sig(t 1 , SK(t 3 )) . If the unification system is obvious, that is σ is the identity substitution, we have C ′ = C \ (E ⊲ t), and then M(C ′ ) = M(C) \ t which implies that M(C ′ ) < M(C). Else, we have nbv(C ′ ) < nbv(C).
This concludes the proof. Proof. Let C be a deterministic constraint system not in solved form and let i be the smallest integer such that t i / ∈ X , then C = {C α , E i ⊲ t i , C β } where C α is in solved form. Let σ be a substitution such that σ |= I ∅ C, and let us prove that C can be reduced to another satisfiable constraint system C ′ by applying the transformation rules given in the algorithm. σ |= I ∅ C, then σ |= I ∅ {C α , E i \ X ⊲ t i , C β } (Lemma 8) and then, (E i \ X )σ → * I ∅ t i σ. We have two cases:
-If t i σ ∈ (E i \ X )σ, there exists a term u ∈ (E i \ X ) such that uσ = t i σ. Let µ be the most general unifier of u and t i , then σ = θµ, and we can simplify C by applying the first transformation rule Unif, C =⇒ C ′ = {C α µ, C β µ}. We have σ |= I ∅ C α and σ |= I ∅ C β , then θ |= I ∅ {C α µ, C β µ}.
-If t i σ / ∈ (E i \ X )σ there exists a derivation starting from (E i \ X )σ of goal t i σ, and then from E i σ of goal t i σ. By lemma 6, there exists a derivation starting from E i σ of goal t i σ such that for all steps in the derivation such that l → r is the applied rule with the substitution σ, for all s ∈ l and s / ∈ X , we have sσ ⊆ E i σ. This implies that we can reduce C to C ′ by applying the Apply rule of transformation and θ |= I ∅ C ′ .
